"A Positive Theory of Bureaucratic Discretion as Agency Choice"

George A. Krause

George.Krause@sc.edu 

Abstract:

         Existing research on the positive theory of bureaucratic 
discretion views this phenomenon as a "supply-side" concept that 
elected officials determine without considering bureaucratic 
preferences altogether, or by merely treating it as being exogenous 
to the optimization problem confronting politicians.  It has been 
well established by bureaucracy scholars that agencies have 
preferences concerning bureaucratic discretion and are proactive in 
trying to get these preferences met (e.g., Rourke 1984; Wilson 
1989). In this essay, I set forth a "demand-side" theory of 
bureaucratic discretion where an administrative agency's preferences 
for this commodity under conditions of uncertainty is determined 
through the relationship between its utility and (a) bureaucratic 
discretion, and (b) policy (implementation) outcome uncertainty, 
separately. Moreover, I argue that the discretionary context 
confronting the agency will matter, and thus incorporate this into 
the theoretical model. Hypotheses concerning the discretionary 
context by which administrative agencies will view bureaucratic 
discretion are generated from this model.  Finally, I propose a 
statistical test that could be employed to empirically test the 
theoretical predictions of the "demand-side" model of bureaucratic 
discretion set forth in this paper.