

First week of EITM: Suggested Readings

The following readings are either essential (two asterisks) or recommended (one asterisk). The readings are organized into four major sections:

- I. Overviews
- II. Theory: Spatial Modeling and Equilibrium Concepts
- III. Empirical: Comparative Statics and Measurement
- IV. Comparative Politics: Protest during Democratic Transitions and Legislative Institutions in Chile.

It would be best if students had read the Riker and Coughlin pieces listed in the Overview section before they come. These pieces provide an overview of what will be covered. Both of them are quite easy to read.

On the first day Henry Brady will cover “Theory: Spatial Models and Equilibrium Concepts” with an emphasis upon the Calvert piece and the Lindbeck and Weibull piece. (There will also be some discussion of the Enelow and Hinich piece.) The Ansolabehere and Snyder piece (“Valence Politics and Equilibrium in Spatial Election Models”) will be covered on Wednesday by Jim Snyder. On Monday evening, Henry Brady will present the paper “Transition and Protest: A Probabilistic Model” which is listed in the Comparative Politics section below.

On the second day, the emphasis will be upon “Empirical: Comparative Statics.” In the morning there will be a discussion of the McKelvey and Ordeshook piece. Then Stephen Ansolabehere will turn to scaling of legislators with a focus on the Ansolabehere and Snyder and Stewart empirical piece and on the Levitt piece.

On the third day, Jim Snyder will discuss some theoretical issues by reviewing the Ansolabehere and Snyder piece and he will discuss “Empirical: Measurement” by discussing the Heckman and Snyder piece.

On the fourth day, John Londregan will discuss “Comparative Politics: Legislative Institutions in Chile” by discussing his *Political Analysis* piece on scaling and chapters from his book, *Legislative Institutions and Ideology in Chile*.

I. OVERVIEWS

** William H. Riker, “Implications from the Disequilibrium of Majority Rule for the Study of Institutions,” *American Political Science Review*, Volume 74, Number 2, June, 1980, 432-446.

** Peter J. Coughlin, “Majority Rule and Election Models,” *Journal of Economic Surveys*, 1990. (Pages 157-188. Essentially the same as Chapter 1 “Majority Rule and Models of Elections,” in Peter J. Coughlin, *Probabilistic Voting Theory*, Cambridge University Press, 1992. 1-24.

* Martin J. Osborne, “Spatial Models of Political Competition under Plurality Rule: A Survey of

Some Explanations of the Number of Candidates and the Positions they Take,” *The Canadian Journal of Economics*, Volume 28, Issue 2, May, 1995, pages 261-301.

* Torsten Persson and Guido Tabellini, *Political Economics: Explaining Economic Policy*, The MIT Press, 2000, Chapters 1-2.

* John Roemer, *Political Competition*, Harvard University Press, 2001, Chapters 1-3.

II. THEORY: SPATIAL MODELING AND EQUILIBRIUM CONCEPTS

** Randall Calvert, “Robustness of the Multidimensional Voting Model: Candidate Motivations, Uncertainty, and Convergence,” *American Journal of Political Science*, February, 1985.

** Assar Lindbeck and Jorgen W. Weibull, “A model of Political Equilibrium in a Representative Democracy,” *Journal of Public Economics*, 1993.

** Stephen Ansolabehere and James M. Snyder, Jr., “Valence Politics and Equilibrium in Spatial Election Models,” *Public Choice*, 2000.

* James M. Enelow and Melvin J. Hinich, “Probabilistic Voting and the Importance of Centrist Ideologies in Democratic Elections,” *Journal of Politics*, May, 1984.

* Ingemar Hansson and Charles Stuart, “Voting Competitions with Interested Politicians: Platforms do not Converge to the Preferences of the Median Voter,” *Public Choice*, 44, 1984.

* Gary Cox, “The Uncovered Set and the Core,” *AJPS*, May, 1987.

III. EMPIRICAL: COMPARATIVE STATICS AND MEASUREMENT

A. OVERALL TESTS OF MODELS

** Richard D. McKelvey and Peter C. Ordeshook, “A Decade of Experimental Research on Spatial Models of Elections and Committees,” in James M. Enelow and Melvin J. Hinich, *Advances in the Spatial Theory of Voting*, Cambridge University Press, 1990.

B. LEGISLATORS

** Stephen Ansolabehere, James M. Snyder, and Charles Stewart, III, “Candidate Positioning in U.S. House Elections,” *AJPS*, January, 2001.

** James Heckman and James M. Snyder, “Linear Probability Models of the Demand for Attributes with an Empirical Application to Estimating the Preferences of Legislators,” *Rand Journal of Economics*, 1997.

* Steven D. Levitt, "How Do Senators Vote? Disentangling the Role of Voter Preferences, Party Affiliation, and Senator Ideology," *American Economic Review*, Volume 86, Number 3, June, 1996, pages 425-441.

* Keith T. Poole and Howard Rosenthal, "A Spatial Model for Legislative Roll Call Analysis," *AJPS*, May, 1985.

* Keith T. Poole and Howard Rosenthal, "Patterns of Congressional Voting," *AJPS*, February, 1991.

* Keith T. Poole, Howard Rosenthal, and Kenneth Koford, "On Dimensionalizing Roll Call Votes in the U.S. Congress," *APSR*, September, 1991.

C. VOTERS

* Henry E. Brady, "Traits versus Issues: Factor Analysis versus Ideal-Point Analysis of Candidates Thermometer Ratings," in James Stimson (editor), *Political Analysis*, Volume 2, University of Michigan, 1991.

* Henry E. Brady, "Dimensional Analysis of Ranking Data," *AJPS*, November, 1990.

* Torben Iversen, "Political Leadership and Representation in West European Democracies: A Test of Three Models of Voting," *AJPS*, Feb., 1994.

D. CANDIDATES AND PARTIES

** Rebecca B. Morton, "Incomplete Information and Ideological Explanations of Platform Divergence," *APSR*, June, 1993.

* Ken Kollman, John H. Miller, Scott E. Page, "Adaptive Parties in Spatial Elections," *APSR*, Volume 86, December, 1992.

IV. COMPARATIVE POLITICS: PROTEST DURING DEMOCRATIC TRANSITIONS AND LEGISLATIVE INSTITUTIONS IN CHILE

** Henry E. Brady, Scott Gehlbach, Cynthia Kaplan, "[Transition and Protest: A Probabilistic Model](#)," paper presented at the Annual Meetings of the Midwest Political Science Association, April, 2002.

** John B. Londregan, "[Estimating Legislators' Preferred Points](#)," *Political Analysis*, Volume 8, pages 35-56, 2000.

** John Londregan, *Legislative Institutions and Ideology in Chile*, Cambridge University Press,

2000. Chapters 2, 4, and 8.

* John B. Londregan, John B, "Appointment, Reelection, and Autonomy in the Senate of Chile." in *Legislative Politics in Latin America*, Scott Morgenstern, and Benito Nacif (editors), New York: Cambridge University Press, 2002, pp. 341-376.

* John M. Carey, "Parties, Coalitions, and the Chilean Congress in the 1990's." in *Legislative Politics in Latin America*, Scott Morgenstern, and Benito Nacif (editors), New York: Cambridge University Press, 2002.