

Empirical Implications of Theoretical Models of Political Institutions

Instructors: John Aldrich and Arthur Lupia

Monday

The Problem of Social Choice: Arrow's Theorem and Majority Voting

A. Sen, *Collective Choice and Social Welfare*, 1970, Chapters 1-3*. (Chapter 3* contains the proof; 1* includes useful set theoretic terms and results on orderings).

D. Black, "On the Rationale of Group Decision-making," *Journal of Political Economy*, February, 1948.

A. Lupia and M. McCubbins, "[Resurrecting the Will of the People: Cognition, Complexity and Social Choice Theory](#)," unpublished ms.

Two-Candidate Competition in a Spatial Model

O. Davis, M. Hinich, and P. Ordeshook, "An Expository Development of a Mathematical Model of the Electoral Process," *American Political Science Review*, June, 1970.

R. McKelvey, "Policy Related Voting and Electoral Equilibrium," *Econometrica*, Sept.-Nov., 1975.

J. Aldrich, "Electoral Choice in 1972," *Journal of Mathematical Sociology*, 1977.

Equilibrium and Disequilibrium in a Spatial Voting Model

C. Plott, "A Notion of Equilibrium and its Possibility under Majority Rule," *American Economic Review*, September, 1967.

G. Kramer, "On a Class of Equilibrium Conditions for Majority Rule," *Econometrica*, March, 1973. (Recommended.)

R. McKelvey, "General Conditions for Global Intransitivities in Formal Voting Models," *Econometrica*, September, 1979.

Might Institutions Help – Or Not?

K. Shepsle, “Institutional Arrangements and Equilibrium in Multidimensional Voting Models,” *American Journal of Political Science*, February, 1979.

W. Riker, “Implications from the Disequilibrium of Majority Rule for the Study of Institutions,” *American Political Science Review*, June, 1980.

Perhaps Institutions Can Help, If You Can Control the Agenda:

Theory:

D. Black, “On the Rationale of Group Decision-making,” *Journal of Political Economy*, February, 1948. (Revisited.)

T. Romer and H. Rosenthal, “Political Resource Allocation, Controlled Agendas, and the Status Quo,” *Public Choice*, Winter, 1978.

Applications:

J. Huber, “Restrictive Legislative Procedures in France and the United States,” *American Political Science Review*,” September, 1992.

T. Romer and H. Rosenthal, “Bureaucrats Versus Voters: On the Political Economy of Resource Allocation by Direct Democracy,” *Quarterly Journal of Economics*,” November, 1979.

P. Spiller and R. Gely, “Congressional Control or Judicial Independence: The Determinants of U.S. Supreme Court Labor-Relations Decisions, 1949-1988,” *Rand Journal of Economics*, Winter, 1992.

Tuesday

Theories of Congress, with Applications

B. Weingast and W. Marshall, “The Industrial Organization of Congress: or, Why Legislatures, Like Firms, are not Organized as Markets,” *The Journal of Political Economy*, February, 1988.

T. Gilligan and K. Krehbiel, “Organization of Informative Committees by a Rational Legislature,” *American Journal of Political Science*, May, 1990.

J. Snyder and T. Grosclose, "Estimating Party Influence in Congressional Roll-Call Voting," *American Journal of Political Science*, April, 2000.

Theories of Inter-branch Politics, Especially with Respect to Delegation

B. Weingast and M. Moran, "Bureaucratic Discretion or Congressional Control? Regulatory Policymaking by the Federal Trade Commission," *Journal of Political Economy*, October, 1983.

T. Moe, "The New Economics of Organization," *American Journal of Political Science*, November, 1984.

R. Kiewiet and M. McCubbins, "Presidential Influence on Congressional Appropriations Decision," *American Journal of Political Science*, August, 1988.

D. Epstein and S. O'Halloran, "Administrative Procedures, Information and Agency Discretion," *American Journal of Political Science*, August, 1994.

D. Epstein and S. O'Halloran, "Divided Government and the Design of Administrative Procedures," *Journal of Politics*, May, 1996.

Institutions and Strategic Coordination

G. Cox, "Strategic Voting Equilibria Under the Single Nontransferable Vote," *The American Political Science Review*, September, 1994.

S. Reed, "Structure and Behaviour: Extending Duverger's Law to the Japanese Case," *British Journal of Political Science*, July, 1990.

K. Bawn, "The Logic of Institutional Preferences: German Electoral Law as a Social Choice Outcome," *American Journal of Political Science*, November, 1993.

E. Gerber, "Legislative Response to the Threat of Popular Initiative," *American Journal of Political Science*, February, 1996.

Wednesday

Special Guest Lecturer, Daniel J. Diermeier
Cabinet Government

Background

E. Browne, J. Frendreis, and D. Gleiber. 1986. "The Process of Cabinet Dissolution: An Exponential Model of Duration and Stability in Western Democracies." *American Journal of Political Science* 30: 628-650.

G. King, J. Alt, M. Laver, and N. Burns. 1990. "A Unified Model of Cabinet Dissolution in Parliamentary Democracies." *American Journal of Political Science* 34: 846-871.

D. Baron. 1991. "A Spatial Bargaining Theory of Government Formation in Parliamentary Systems." *American Journal of Political Science* 33: 1048-1084.

P. Warwick. 1992. "Rising Hazards: An Underlying Dynamic of Parliamentary Government." *American Journal of Political Science* 36: 857-876.

A. Lupia and K. Strom. 1995. "Coalition Termination and the Strategic Timing of Parliamentary Elections." *American Political Science Review* 89: 648-665.

D. Diermeier and R. Stevenson. 1999. "Cabinet Terminations and Critical Events." *American Political Science Review* 94: 627-640.

Recent Developments

D. Diermeier and A. Merlo. 2000. "Government Turnover in Parliamentary Democracies." *Journal of Economic Theory* 94: 46-79.

D. Diermeier, H. Eraslan, and A. Merlo. 2001. "[Coalition Governments and Comparative Constitutional Design](#)." Manuscript.

D. Diermeier, H. Eraslan, and A. Merlo. 2001. "[A Structural Model of Government Formation](#)." Manuscript.

D. Diermeier, H. Eraslan, and A. Merlo. 2002. "[Bicameralism and Government Formation](#)." Manuscript.

Thursday

Special Guest Lecturer: Nolan McCarty: Separating Power by Joining Theory and Methods

“Veto Power and Legislation: An Empirical Analysis of Executive-Legislative Bargaining from 1961-1986” (with Keith T. Poole). 1995. *Journal of Law, Economics, & Organization*, 11(2):282-312.

“The Politics of Blame: Bargaining before an Audience,” (with Timothy Groseclose) 2000. *American Journal of Political Science*. 45(1):100-119.

“The Tenure of Political Appointees” (with Kelly Chang and David E. Lewis). Paper presented at the 2000 American Political Science Association, Washington, D.C.

"Vetoes in the Early Republic" working paper.

Friday

Institutions and Commitment

D. North and B. Weingast, “Constitutions and Commitment: The Evolution of Institutional Governing Public Choice in Seventeenth-Century England,” *Journal of Economic History*,” December, 1989.

A. Greif, P. Milgrom, and B. Weingast, “Coordination, Commitment, and Enforcement: The Case of the Merchant Guild,” *Journal of Political Economy*,” August, 1994.

Information and Institutions

M. McCubbins, T. Schwartz. 1984. “Congressional Oversight Overlooked: Police Patrols versus Fire Alarms.” *American Journal of Political Science* 28: 165-179.

R. McKelvey, P. Ordeshook. 1986. “Information, Electoral Equilibria, and the Democratic Ideal.” *Journal of Politics* 48: 909-937.

R. Morton, 1993. “Incomplete Information and Ideological Explanations of Platform Divergence.” *American Political Science Review* 87: 382-392.

A. Lupia, M. McCubbins. 1998. *The Democratic Dilemma: Can Citizens Learn What They Need to Know?* New York: Cambridge University Press. (Chapters 6 and 7; pp.97-148).

A. Lupia, 2002. "Institutions as Informational Crutches: Using Rational Choice Theory to Improve Civic Competence." Forthcoming in Irwin Morris, Joe A. Oppenheimer, and Karol Soltan (eds.) *Politics from Anarchy to Democracy*

Thinking about Institutions, again

D. Diermeier and K. Krehbiel, "[Institutionalism as Methodology](#)," unpub., May, 2002.