

The Spatial Model

Overture: One Dimensional Policy Spaces

Act One: The Promise of Political Equilibrium

Act Two: Examples of Spatial Models and Preferences: False Promises of Equilibrium Even When It Exists

Act Three: False Paradise Lost—Multi-Dimensional Models


Act Four: Paradise Regained?

- Spreading parties apart: Political Entry, Valence issues, and uncertainty in one dimension.
- Regaining Equilibrium in multiple dimensions: New solution concepts, predictive dimension, and probabilistic models.

Overture: One Dimensional Policy Spaces

- Where did parties and political issues come from? What type of parties now exist in Europe?**
- What is the dimensionality of the issue space?**
- Where are parties located?**
- Is there a relationship between elite and mass positions?**
- Do party positions change over time?**
- Conclusions?**

Development of Political Parties –
The Role of Time and Social Class



Major Parties in Some Western Democracies

Party Types Arrayed from Roughly Left to Right

<i>Country</i>	<i>Ecology/ Green</i>	<i>Communist</i>	<i>Socialist</i>	<i>Center & Christian Democrat</i>	<i>Liberal & Republican</i>	<i>Conser- vative</i>	<i>Right Wing</i>
USA					Democrat/ Republican		
Great Britain			Labour		Liberal- Democrats	Tories	
Canada			New Democrats		Liberals	Tories	Reform
French V	Ecology	PCF	PS	CDS	UDF	Gaullist	FN
Germany FRG	Greens		SPD	CDU/ CSU	FDP		
Weimar Germany		KPD	SPD	Center	DDP/ DVP	DNVP	NAZI
France IV		PCF	SFIO	MRP	Radicals/ Republican	Gaullist	Pouja- dist

KEY:

CDS -- Democratic and Social Center (France)
 CDU -- Christian Democratic Union (Germany)
 CSU -- Christain Social Union (Germany)
 DDP -- Deutsch Democratic Party (Germany)
 DNVP --- Deutsch National Volks (People's) Party (Germany)
 DVP -- Deutsch Volks (People's) Party (Germany)
 FDP --- Free Democratic Party (Germany)
 FN --- National Front (France)
 KPD --- Communist Party of Deutschland (Germany)
 MRP --- Popular Republican Movement (France)
 PCF --- Communist Party of France
 PS --- Socialist Party (France)
 SFIO -- French Section of Industrial Ouvrieres (Workers)
 SPD --- Social Democratic Party (Germany)
 UDF -- Union for French Democracy




Fig 1.1. Position of party leaders on the issue of public ownership




Fig 1.2. Position of party leaders on social policy issues

SOURCE: ~~Har~~ Laver & Hunt





Fig 1.1. Position of party leaders on the issue of public ownership



median party position

Fig 1.1. Position of party leaders on the issue of public ownership





Fig 1.2. Position of party leaders on social policy issues

Dimensionality of European Political Parties



SOURCE: LAVER & MUNT

Figure 1. The Distribution of Parties on Two Policy Dimensions





Figure 1 makes it evident that, at the level of parties, the two policy dimensions are highly correlated ($r = .78$). Consequently, the policy alternatives presented to voters tend to be “compressed” into a superdimension or a main axis of electoral competition (Kitschelt n.d., chap. 4). As Enelow and Hinich (1984) have argued, this may also partly reflect that voters tend to evaluate parties on a single underlying ideological dimension. On this background, and for purposes of presentational economy, the four issues have been combined into a single additive left-right index. The index has been normalized to produce a left-right scale in the interval $[-1, 1]$. The index is used in the first test below, whereas in the second test, the four issues are treated separately.

Test 1: Relative Spatial Positions of Parties and Party Voters

Assuming that parties are vote maximizers, the three models predict different patterns of relative party-voter policy locations as suggested in Figure 2. In the pure spatial model, parties will be spread over the policy space (assuming a multiparty system) and will mirror the central tendency of attitudes in their electorates.¹⁸ In the pure directional model, all parties

Figure 3. The Left-Right Position of Mean Party Voters and Party Elites



Key:


..... Mirror line

— Regression line

Note: See Appendix C for the full names of parties.

according to the mean position of the party elite and the mean position of the party electorate. The emerging pattern is precisely that expected from the representational policy leadership model. Thus, compared to the 45-degree "mirror line"—which indicates a perfect match in opinions—parties to the right of the center tend to be more to the right than is the mean voter in their electorates (e.g., the Danish and British conservative parties), while left parties are systematically farther to the left than the mean voter in their electorates is (e.g., the Dutch and Belgian socialist parties). Center parties, on the other hand, are generally much closer than extreme parties are to the mean voter in their electorates. For example, the center-oriented Dutch CDA, the Belgian CVP/PSC and PRL/PVV, and the British Liberals all attract voters who are also largely centrist in political orientation.¹⁹

Figure 2. Distribution of Respondents' Left-Right Self-Placements, Mean Party Placements, and Mean Positions of Parties' Supporters



similar to, but more extreme than the positions of their supporters, is consistent with the Iversen representational policy leadership model which was the starting point of this paper.

Although our heuristic arguments in Section 3 presupposed that voters choose deterministically as a function of measured policy and nonpolicy motivations, in reality voters' measured party utilities imply only a *likelihood* of vote choice, not a certainty, since voters also have unmeasured motivations. We incorporate these unmeasured motivations, which render the vote choice probabilistic from the analyst's perspective, into Equation 7, in which voter *i*'s utility for party K, $U_i(K)$, is

does appear deviant, and the other techniques

these results, however, the stability of the computer-coded spread informal party shifted sharply to the right on the policy spectrum in 1997. The expert estimates in 1997 showed a shift towards the centre, with the Liberal Democrats towards the left. The Conservatives was, in 1997, placed further to the right than the Labour and the Liberal Democrats rather than to the left as in 1992.

At the computer-generated estimates is an important shift in 1997. The 1989 and 1997 expert estimates are very closely mirrored by computer-generated estimates. The Liberal Democrats shifted clearly to the rightwards shift in 1997. The computer-coded content analysis shows a shift between 1992 and 1997. Both the Liberal Democrats and the Conservatives scales based upon expert estimates are more extreme than the manifestos are more moderate. At the Conservatives scale, the Liberal Democrats remained in the

however, the reversal of the Liberal Democrats. Considering that one objective judgment of the analysis of party positions is another involves the use of the techniques corre-

social values, all scales

FIGURE 1 Standardized Expert Survey, Computer Coded and Expert Coded Estimates of Party Policy Positions in Britain 1992-97

Laver & Garry
AJPS, 2000





Figure 6. Annual Movement of Senators and Representatives


Members in at Least Five Congresses



mond proves the rule.) An immediate implication of this result is that changes in congressional voting patterns occur almost entirely through the process of replacement of retiring or defeated legislators with new blood.²⁶ Politically, selection is far more important than adaptation. Of course, Congress as a whole may adapt by, for example, moving to protectionism when jobs are lost to foreign

Poole & Rosenkrantz

Figure 9. Average within and between Party Distances



ness of most corporate political action committees to spread their campaign contributions across the entire space, the most liberal Democrats in the southwest quadrant excepted (see Poole and Rosenthal 1989b). Although a well-defined two-party system persists and although liberals and conservatives maintain stable alignments within each party (Poole and Rosenthal 1989b), the

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A New Spatial Theory of Party Competition 459

BJPS, 1994




Fig. 1a. Left-right positions of British parties 1945-92 mapped from election programmes



Fig. 1b. Left-right positions of German parties 1949-87 mapped from election programmes