

Empirical Implications of Theoretical Models of Political Institutions
Week 1: Institutions

Instructors: John Aldrich and Arthur Lupia.
Guest Lecturers: David Epstein & Daniel Diermeier
Times: Monday-Friday 9-12 & 1:15-4:30.

Monday 9-10:30. Instructions. Introductions. Brief description of student paper topics.

Monday 10:30-12.

The Problem of Social Choice: Arrow's Theorem and Majority Voting

A. Sen, *Collective Choice and Social Welfare*, 1970, Chapters 1-3*. (Chapter 3* contains the proof; 1* includes useful set theoretic terms and results on orderings).

K. Shepsle, "Institutional Arrangements and Equilibrium in Multidimensional Voting Models," *American Journal of Political Science*, February, 1979.

W. Riker, "Implications from the Disequilibrium of Majority Rule for the Study of Institutions," *American Political Science Review*, June, 1980.

A. Lupia and M. McCubbins, "Resurrecting the Will of the People: Cognition, Complexity and Social Choice Theory." Forthcoming in M. McCubbins, D. Rodriguez and B. Weingast (eds.) *Positive Political Theory of Law*. 2003.

Monday 1:15-2:45.

Introducing Institutions: Two-Candidate Competition in a Spatial Model

J. Aldrich, "Electoral Choice in 1972," *Journal of Mathematical Sociology*, 1977.

J. Aldrich & R.D. McKelvey. "A Method of Scaling with Applications to the 1968 and 1972 U.S. Presidential Elections," *American Political Science Review*, March, 1977.

Recommended:

O. Davis, M. Hinich, and P. Ordeshook, "An Expository Development of a Mathematical Model of the Electoral Process," *American Political Science Review*, June, 1970.

R. McKelvey, "Policy Related Voting and Electoral Equilibrium," *Econometrica*, Sept.-Nov., 1975.

Monday 3-4:30

Introducing Institutions: The Importance of Agenda Control

D. Black, "On the Rationale of Group Decision-making," *Journal of Political Economy*, February, 1948.

T. Romer and H. Rosenthal, "Political Resource Allocation, Controlled Agendas, and the Status Quo," *Public Choice*, Winter, 1978.

J. Huber, "Restrictive Legislative Procedures in France and the United States," *American Political Science Review*," September, 1992.

E. Gerber, "Legislative Response to the Threat of Popular Initiative," *American Journal of Political Science*, February, 1996.

Recommended

T. Romer and H. Rosenthal, "Bureaucrats Versus Voters: On the Political Economy of Resource Allocation by Direct Democracy," *Quarterly Journal of Economics*," November, 1979.

Tuesday 9-9:45.

Presentation of First Assignment.

Tuesday 10-12

Implications of Multiple Chambers

G. Tsebelis. 1995. "Decision Making in Political Systems: Veto Players in Presidentialism, Parliamentarism, Multicameralism, and Multipartyism." *British Journal of Political Science* 25: 289-326.

G. Tsebelis. 1999. "Veto Players and Law Production in Parliamentary Democracies: An Empirical Analysis," *American Political Science Review* 93(3): 591-808.

D. Diermeier and R.B. Myerson. 1999. "Bicameralism and Its Consequences for the Internal Organization of Legislatures" *The American Economic Review* 89(5): 1182-1196.

K. Bawn. 1993. "The Logic of Institutional Preferences: German Electoral Law as a Social Choice Outcome." *American Journal of Political Science* 37(4): 965-989.

Tuesday 1:15 –2:45

Candidate Entry and Competition

D. Rohde. "Risk-Bearing and Progressive Ambition: The Case of Members of the United States House of Representatives" *American Journal of Political Science*, Vol. 23, No. 1. (Feb., 1979), pp. 1-26

J. Banks and D. Kiewiet. 1989. "Explaining Patterns of Candidate Competition in Congressional Elections." *American Journal of Political Science* 33: 997-1015.

J. Aldrich and W. Bianco. "A Game-Theoretic Model of Party Affiliation of Candidates and Office Holders," *Mathematical and Computer Modeling*, 1992.

J. Carson. 2003. "Strategic Interaction and Candidate Competition in US House elections: Empirical Applications of Probit and Strategic Probit Models. Unpublished Manuscript.

Recommended

D. Canon "Sacrificial Lambs or Strategic Politicians? Political Amateurs in US House Elections." *American Journal of Political Science*, Vol. 37, No. 4. (Nov., 1993), pp. 1119-1141.

Tuesday 3-4

Implications of Staggered Terms

Abhinay Muthoo and Kenneth A. Shepsle. 2002. "Organizations with Overlapping Generations of Players." Manuscript available at www.isnie.org/ISNIE02.

Kenneth A. Shepsle, Eric S. Dickson, and Robert P. Van Houwelling. 2003. "Bargaining in Legislatures with Overlapping Generations of Politicians." Harvard University Working Paper.

Tuesday 4-4:30

The class breaks into 4-person panels. More extended paper topic discussions ensue.

Wednesday 9-10:30

Group Presentations of Second Assignment

Wednesday 10:30-12

Implications of Multiple Branches

K. Shepsle and B. Weingast, "The Institutional Foundations of Committee Power," *American Political Science Review*, March, 1987.

N. McCarty and T. Groseclose. 2000. "The Politics of Blame: Bargaining before an Audience," *American Journal of Political Science*. 45(1): 100-119.

B. Weingast and M. Moran, "Bureaucratic Discretion or Congressional Control? Regulatory Policymaking by the Federal Trade Commission," *Journal of Political Economy*, October, 1983.

R. Kiewiet and M. McCubbins, "Presidential Influence on Congressional Appropriations Decision," *American Journal of Political Science*, August, 1988.

Recommended

T. Moe, "The New Economics of Organization," *American Journal of Political Science*, November, 1984.

Wednesday 1:30-2:15

Political Control of the Bureaucracy - I

M.D. McCubbins, R. Noll, and B. Weingast. 1989. "Structure and Process, Politics and Policy: Administrative Arrangements and the Political Control of Agencies." *Virginia Law Review* 75 (2):431-482)

T. Moe. 1989. "The Politics of Bureaucratic Structure." In *Can the Government Govern?* edited by J. Chubb and P. Peterson. Washington, D.C.: Brookings Institution.

Wednesday 2:30-4:30

Political Control of the Bureaucracy - II

D. Epstein and S. O'Halloran. 1999. *Delegating Powers: A Transactions Cost Approach to Policy Making Under Separate Powers*. (Selected chapters required, others recommended).

Recommended:

D. Epstein and S. O'Halloran, "Administrative Procedures, Information and Agency Discretion," *American Journal of Political Science*, August, 1994.

D. Epstein and S. O'Halloran, "Divided Government and the Design of Administrative Procedures," *Journal of Politics*, May, 1996.

Thursday 9-11

Political Control of the Bureaucracy - III

Students present Epstein assignment. Discussions ensue.

Thursday 11-12

Institutions and Commitment

D. North and B. Weingast, "Constitutions and Commitment: The Evolution of Institutional Governing Public Choice in Seventeenth-Century England," *Journal of Economic History*," December, 1989.

A. Greif, P. Milgrom, and B. Weingast, "Coordination, Commitment, and Enforcement: The Case of the Merchant Guild," *Journal of Political Economy*," August, 1994.

Thursday 1:15-2:30

Introducing Information to the Formal Study of Institutions

T. Gilligan and K. Krehbiel. 1987. "Collective Decision-Making and Standing Committees: An Informational Rationale for Restrictive Amendment Procedures," *Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization* 3: 287-335.

D. Austen-Smith and W. Riker "Asymmetric Information and the Coherence of Legislation" *American Political Science Review*, Vol. 81, No. 3. (Sep., 1987), pp. 897-918.

Thursday 2:30-4:30

Information, Institutions & Experiments

R. McKelvey, P. Ordeshook. 1986. "Information, Electoral Equilibria, and the Democratic Ideal." *Journal of Politics* 48: 909-937.

A. Lupia, M. McCubbins. 1998. *The Democratic Dilemma: Can Citizens Learn What They Need to Know?* New York: Cambridge University Press. (Chapters 6&7 required, chapters 8&9 recommended, chapter 3 describes the main theory and its appendix contains the relevant proofs).

Recommended:

- A. Lupia. 1992. "Busy Voters, Agenda Control and the Power of Information." *American Political Science Review* 86: 390-403.
- A. Lupia. 1994. "Shortcuts versus Encyclopedias: Information and Voting Behavior in California Insurance Reform Elections." *American Political Science Review* 88: 63-76.
- A. Lupia. 2003. "Can Political Institutions Increase Citizens' Competence? Findings from a Formal Model and Two Experiments." Forthcoming in Irwin Morris, Joe A. Oppenheimer, and Karol Soltan (eds.) *Politics from Anarchy to Democracy*. Forthcoming, Stanford University Press.

Friday 9-10:30

Bargaining and Cabinet Government

- A. Lupia and K. Strom. 1995. "Coalition Termination and the Strategic Timing of Parliamentary Elections." *American Political Science Review* 89: 648-665.
- D. Diermeier and R. Stevenson. 1999. "Cabinet Terminations and Critical Events." *American Political Science Review* 94: 627-640.

Recommended

- E. Browne, J. Frendreis, and D. Gleiber. 1986. "The Process of Cabinet Dissolution: An Exponential Model of Duration and Stability in Western Democracies." *American Journal of Political Science* 30: 628-650.
- G. King, J. Alt, M. Laver, and N. Burns. 1990. "A Unified Model of Cabinet Dissolution in Parliamentary Democracies." *American Journal of Political Science* 34: 846-871.
- P. Warwick. 1992. "Rising Hazards: An Underlying Dynamic of Parliamentary Government." *American Journal of Political Science* 36: 857-876.

Friday 10:30-12, 1:30-3

Guest Lecturer: Daniel Diermeier

- D. Diermeier and A. Merlo. 2000. "Government Turnover in Parliamentary Democracies." *Journal of Economic Theory* 94: 46-79.
- D. Diermeier, H. Eraslan, and A. Merlo. 2002. "Bicameralism and Government Formation." Manuscript.

Recommended

- D. Diermeier, H. Eraslan, and A. Merlo. 2002. "Coalition Governments and Comparative Constitutional Design." *European Economic Review*. 46: 893-907.

D. Diermeier, H. Eraslan, and A. Merlo. 2003. "A Structural Model of Government Formation." *Econometrica*. 71(1):27-70.

Friday: 3:30 -4:30.

Conclusion: Contrasting Views of Institutional Research

D. Diermeier and K. Krehbiel, "Institutionalism as Methodology." Forthcoming *Journal of Theoretical Politics*.

D. Austen-Smith & J. Banks. 1998. "Social Choice Theory, Game Theory, and Positive Political Theory." *Annual Review of Political Science* 1: 259-287.

P. Johnson. 1999. "Simulation Modeling in Political Science." *American Behavioral Scientist* 42 (10) 1509-1530.