

Week 1: Institutions and Institutional Analysis

Leads: John Aldrich and Arthur Lupia
Guest faculty: Orit Kedar and Nolan McCarty

Monday, 19 June

9:00-10:30 Instructions. Introductions. Goals.

10:30-12:00 Arrow's Theorem and its Implications for Collective Choice

K. Shepsle, "Institutional Arrangements and Equilibrium in Multidimensional Voting Models," *American Journal of Political Science*, February, 1979.

W. Riker, "Implications from the Disequilibrium of Majority Rule for the Study of Institutions," *American Political Science Review*, June, 1980.

A. Lupia and M. McCubbins, "Lost in Translation: Social Choice Theory is Misapplied Against Legislative Intent." *Journal of Contemporary Legal Issues*, February, 2005.

Recommended: A. Sen, *Collective Choice and Social Welfare*, 1970, Chapters 1-3*.

12:00-1:15 Lunch

1:15-2:00 Introducing Institutions: Agenda Control in a Spatial Model

D. Black, "On the Rationale of Group Decision-Making," *Journal of Political Economy*, February, 1948.

T. Romer and H. Rosenthal, "Political Resource Allocation, Controlled Agendas, and the Status Quo," *Public Choice*, Winter, 1978.

Recommended:

E. Gerber, "Legislative Response to the Threat of Popular Initiative," *American Journal of Political Science*, February, 1996.

T. Romer and H. Rosenthal, "Bureaucrats Versus Voters: On the Political Economy of Resource Allocation by Direct Democracy," *Quarterly Journal of Economics*, November, 1979.

2:15-3:00 Introducing Institutions: Competition in a Spatial Model

J. Aldrich, "Electoral Choice in 1972," *Journal of Mathematical Sociology*, 1977.

J. Aldrich & R.D. McKelvey. "A Method of Scaling with Applications to the 1968 and 1972 U.S. Presidential Elections," *American Political Science Review*, March, 1977.

K. Poole and H. Rosenthal, "A Spatial Model For Legislative Roll Call Analysis." *American Journal of Political Science*, May 1985, 357-384.

3:15-4:00 Initial Group Discussions with Aldrich-Lupia

6:00-8:00 Social event/dinner @ Arbor Brewing Company (ABC)

Tuesday, 20 June

9:00-10:15 Group Presentations of First Assignment.

10:30 –11:45 Candidate Entry and Competition

D. Rohde. "Risk-Bearing and Progressive Ambition: The Case of Members of the United States House of Representatives" *American Journal of Political Science*, Vol. 23, No. 1. (Feb., 1979), pp. 1-26.

J. Carson. "Strategic Interaction and Candidate Competition in U.S. House Elections: Empirical Applications of Probit and Strategic Probit Models," *Political Analysis*, Autumn, 2003; 11: 368 - 380.

Recommended:

J. Banks and D. Kiewiet. 1989. "Explaining Patterns of Candidate Competition in Congressional Elections. *American Journal of Political Science* 33: 997-1015.

J. Aldrich and W. Bianco. "A Game-Theoretic Model of Party Affiliation of Candidates and Office Holders," *Mathematical and Computer Modeling*, 1992.

D. Canon "Sacrificial Lambs or Strategic Politicians? Political Amateurs in US House Elections." *American Journal of Political Science*, Vol. 37, No. 4. (Nov., 1993), pp. 1119-1141.

11:45-1:15 Lunch

1:15-2:45 Strategic Voting

R.D. McKelvey and R. Niemi. 1978. "A Multistage Game Representation of Sophisticated Voting for Binary Procedures." *Journal of Economic Theory* 18: 1-22.

McKelvey, Richard D., and Peter C. Ordeshook. 1972. "A General Theory of the Calculus of Voting." In *Mathematical Applications in Political Science*, eds. J. Herndon and J. Bernd. Vol. 6. Charlottesville: University of Virginia Press, pp. 32–78.

Blais, Andre, John H. Aldrich, Indridi Indridason, and Renan Levine "Do Voters Care About Government Coalitions? Testing Downs' Pessimistic Conclusion" (forthcoming).

3:00-4:00 Class workshop about participant projects with Aldrich, Brady and Lupia

6:30-9:00 Pizza&Modeling Night: Eldersveld Room (Aldrich&Lupia): "Introduction to Formal Modeling." A review of basic concepts and a discussion of game theory and causal inference.

Wednesday, 21 June

9:00-10:00 Coalition Governance: The Beginning

D. Austen-Smith and J.S. Banks. 1988. "Elections, Coalitions, and Legislative Outcomes." *American Political Science Review*, 82(2): 405-422.

B. Grofman. 1985. "The Neglected Role of the Status Quo in Models of Issue Voting." *Journal of Politics* 47 (1): 230-237.

10:15-11:30 Coalition Governance: The End

A. Lupia and K. Strom. 1995. "Coalition Termination and the Strategic Timing of Parliamentary Elections." *American Political Science Review* 89: 648-665.

D. Diermeier and R. Stevenson. 2000. "Cabinet Terminations and Critical Events." *American Political Science Review* 94: 627-640.

Recommended: S.C. Gordon. 2002. "Stochastic Dependence in Competing Risks" *American Journal of Political Science* 46: 200-217.

11:30-1:00 Lunch

1:00-3:15 Guest Lecturer: Orit Kedar

O. Kedar. 2005. "When Moderate Voters Prefer Extreme Parties: Policy Balancing in Parliamentary Elections." *American Political Science Review*, 99(2): 185-199.

Recommended:

O. Kedar. 2005. "How Diffusion of Power in Parliaments Affects Voter Choice." 2005. *Political Analysis*, 13(4): 410-429. (focus on pp. 414-429)

T. Iversen. 1994. "Political Leadership and Representation in West European Democracies: A Test of Three Models of Voting." *American Journal of Political Science* 38 (February): 45-74.

R.J. Franzese, Jr. 2005. "Empirical Strategies for Various Manifestations of Multilevel Data." *Political Analysis* 13(4): 430-446.

3:30-4:30 Class workshop on participant projects with Aldrich, Kedar, and Lupia

Thursday, 22 June

9:30 -11:15

N. McCarty, K.T. Poole and H. Rosenthal. 2001. "The Hunt for Party Discipline in Congress." *American Political Science Review* 95: 673-688.

N. McCarty, K.T. Poole and H. Rosenthal. *Polarized America: The Dance of Ideology and Unequal Riches*. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press. Chapter 2.

D.S. Lee, E. Moretti and M.J. Butler, "Do Voters Effect or Elect Policies: evidence from the U.S. House." *Quarterly Journal of Economics* Volume 119, Number 3, 1 August 2004, pp. 807-859(53).

J. Aldrich, M. Brady, S. deMarchi, I. McDonald, B. Nyhan, D. Rohde, and M. Tofias, "The Dynamics of Partisan Behavior: CPG in the House and in the Districts, 1982-2000," paper

delivered at the Annual Meeting of the Southern Political Science Association, Atlanta, GA, January, 2006.

Recommended: J.H. Aldrich, D.W. Rohde, and M. Tofias, "One D Is Not Enough: Measuring Conditional Party Government, 1887-2002," in *Party, Process, and Political Change in Congress: Further New Perspectives on the History of Congress*, edited by D. Brady and M.D. McCubbins, Stanford University Press (forthcoming).

11:15-1:00 Lunch

1:00-3:15 Guest Lecturer: Nolan D. McCarty Professor McCarty will discuss his new research on the measurement of partisan polarization in legislatures.

3:30-4:30 Class workshop on participant projects with Aldrich, Lupia, and McCarty

Friday, 23 June

9:00-10:30 Institutions and Strategic Information Transmission

A. Lupia and M.D. McCubbins. 1998. *The Democratic Dilemma: Can Citizens Learn What They Need to Know?* New York: Cambridge University Press. Chapters 1 and 3.

Recommended: A. Lupia. 1994. "Short Cuts versus Encyclopedias: Information and Voting Behavior in California Insurance Reform Elections. *American Political Science Review* 88: 63-76.

10:45-11:45 Modeling the Mind - I

E.S. Dickson, C. Hafer, and D. Landa. 2006. "Cognition and Strategy: A Deliberation Experiment." Manuscript. New York University.

R. McKelvey and T. Palfrey, "An Experimental Study of the Centipede Game, *Econometrica*, Vol 60, No 4, July, 1992, 803-63.

Recommended:

C. Signorino, "Structure and Uncertainty in Discrete Choice Models," *Political Analysis*, Vol. 11: 316-44, 2003.

R. McKelvey and T. Palfrey, "Quantal Response Equilibria for Normal Form Games," *Games and Economic Behavior*, 10, 6-38, 1995.

11:45-1:15 Lunch

1:15-2:00 Modeling the Mind-II

A. Lupia and N. Zharinova. 2006. "Can Counterfactual Variations Affect Strategic Behavior? Implications of Self-Confirming Equilibria for Political Science." Manuscript, University of Michigan and Princeton University.

Recommended:

A. Lupia and J.O. Menning. 2006. "When Can Politicians Scare Citizens Into Supporting Bad Policies: Strategy and Emotion in an Equilibrium of Fear." Manuscript, U Michigan.

A.G. Sanfey, J.K. Rilling, J.A. Aronson, L.E. Nystrom, and J.D. Cohen. 2003. "The Neural Basis of Economic Decision-Making in the Ultimatum Game." *Science* 300: 1755-1958.

2:15-3:30 *Experiments on Information and Institutions II*

A. Lupia and M.D. McCubbins. 1998. *The Democratic Dilemma: Can Citizens Learn What They Need to Know?* New York: Cambridge University Press. Chapters 6 and 7.